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Non-Technical Summary 
Last year’s assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
reemphasized the urgency of combating global warming. As the primary causes of climate 
change the report highlights fossil fuel use and land use change, the latter accounting for 
roughly one fifth of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. In this context, reducing 
emissions from tropical deforestation was recently proposed as a key element of future 
climate policy. Forests play a twofold role in climate change: while growing trees absorb 
carbon dioxide from the air and store carbon by the process of photosynthesis, forests can 
become a major emissions source when the stored carbon is released into the atmosphere by 
means of deforestation activities. This paper quantitatively assesses the economic implications 
of crediting carbon abatement from reduced deforestation for the emissions market in 2020. 
We find that integrating avoided deforestation in international emissions trading considerably 
decreases the costs of post-Kyoto climate policy – even when accounting for conventional 
abatement options of developing countries. At the same time, tropical rainforest regions 
receive substantial net revenues from exporting carbon-offset credits to the industrialized 
world. Moreover, reduced deforestation can increase environmental effectiveness by enabling 
industrialized countries to tighten their carbon constraints without increasing mitigation costs.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der neueste Bericht des Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change hat die Dringlichkeit 
einer Bekämpfung der globalen Erwärmung nochmals unterstrichen. Als primäre Ursachen 
des Klimawandels gelten neben dem Verbrauch fossiler Brennstoffe vor allem Landnutzungs-
veränderungen. In der aktuellen klimapolitischen Debatte wird daher die Verringerung von 
Kohlenstoffemissionen aus Abholzungsaktivitäten in tropischen Weltregionen als eine 
kosteneffiziente Maßnahme des Klimaschutzes vorgeschlagen. Dieses Papier analysiert die 
ökonomischen Auswirkungen einer Integration von globalen Entwaldungsaktivitäten in den 
internationalen Emissionshandel. Quantitative Simulationsrechnungen zeigen, dass diese 
Maßnahme zu substantiellen Kosteneinsparungen der Klimapolitik für Industrienationen 
führt, da die Grenzkosten der Emissionsvermeidung durch verminderte Entwaldungs-
aktivitäten in tropischen Regionen geringer sind als die Grenzkosten konventioneller 
Vermeidungsmaßnahmen in Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern. Die Unterzeichnerstaaten 
des Kyoto-Protokolls könnten mit dieser neuartigen Maßnahme zudem eine ambitionierte 
Klimapolitik umsetzen, ohne die Kosten des Klimaschutzes zu erhöhen. 
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1 Introduction 
Last year’s assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
reemphasized the urgency of combating climate change by stating that “continued greenhouse 
gas emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and induce many 
changes in the global climate system during the 21st century” (IPCC, 2007). As the primary 
causes of climate change the report highlights fossil fuel use and land use change, the latter 
accounting for roughly one fifth of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  
Assessing future strategies for solving the climate problem, Pacala and Socolow (2004) 
propose a set of options to reduce global carbon emissions within the next 50 years. One 
prominent option among the 15 proposed strategies is reducing tropical deforestation and the 
management of temperate and tropical forests. Emphasizing the importance of early 
international action for limiting global warming, also the Stern Review recently suggested 
emissions reductions from avoiding deforestation as a key element of cost-effective future 
climate policy (Stern, 2007). Forests play a twofold role in climate change by sequestering 
large quantities of carbon: while growing trees absorb carbon dioxide from the air and store 
carbon by the process of photosynthesis, forests can become a major emissions source when 
the stored carbon is released into the atmosphere by means of forest degradation and 
deforestation activities. Most commonly, the latter imply the logging or burning of rainforests 
for the production of wood and non-wood forest products or for agricultural land use. Recent 
studies estimate the net annual forest loss in Africa alone to amount to 4 million hectares, 
implying that the continuing decline of primary rainforest in tropical regions is a matter of 
growing concern (FAO, 2007). 
Heal (1999) analyzes economic mechanisms through which goods and services provided by 
tropical forests and their biodiversity could be marketed. One discussed mechanism is the 
financial compensation for carbon sequestration services of forests under an international 
climate agreement, potentially generating incomes high enough to radically change the 
incentives for forest conservation. Supported by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, Papua 
New Guinea recently proposed to address reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD) within the international climate regime (UNFCCC, 2005). Whereas 
under the Kyoto Protocol only forestation and reforestation activities are eligible for crediting 
the associated carbon abatement, the proposal suggested that developing countries might 
commit to reducing emissions from deforestation – in exchange for receiving tradable carbon 
abatement credits and participating in international post-Kyoto emissions trading. 
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Over the last decades, the most important obstacle for the implementation of ambitious 
climate policies has been the associated mitigation costs. As a prominent example, the long 
drawn negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol eventually allowed business-as-usual emissions and 
imposed negligible compliance costs of regulation (Böhringer and Vogt, 2003). Thus, a viable 
and environmentally effective strategy for future climate policy has to be economically 
attractive at the same time. Against this background, the World Bank has proposed Forest 
Carbon Finance as an “ungrasped opportunity” of reducing global carbon emissions at low 
costs (Chomitz et al., 2007). As the marginal costs for reducing carbon by reducing tropical 
deforestation are expected to be far lower than emissions abatement options in industrialized 
countries, these countries could finance farmers in tropical regions for forest conservation 
rather than pursuing costly emissions abatement efforts at home. Given the low economic 
returns of agricultural land use in tropical rainforest regions, such incentive payments for 
avoiding deforestation could at the same time benefit the developing world. Moreover, they 
may pave the way for developing countries to actively take part in emissions reduction efforts 
within an international climate policy regime (Dutschke and Wolf, 2007). 
The economic aspects of international emissions trading have been assessed in a number of 
previous quantitative studies on the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS). These studies employ both partial and general equilibrium models to illustrate the 
economic efficiency gains from “where flexibility” of carbon abatement, and highlight the 
welfare costs of restricting emissions trading to energy-intensive sectors of the economy 
(Weyant and Hill, 1999; Böhringer et al., 2005; Klepper and Peterson, 2006). Furthermore, 
Anger (2007) shows that parallel carbon trading within the EU ETS and among post-Kyoto 
governments yields considerable efficiency gains and increases the economic importance of 
project-based emissions reductions in developing countries via the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Regarding the role of deforestation in international climate policy, 
several studies assessed the relationship between tropical deforestation and climate change as 
well as the institutional aspects of including forestry activities in a post-Kyoto agreement 
(Moutinho and Schwartzman, 2005; Schlamadinger and Bird, 2007; Amano and Sedjo, 2006). 
The quantitative economic literature assessing deforestation in the context of climate policy is 
comparably scant. Linking a forestry model to a climate-economy model, Sohngen and 
Mendelsohn (2003) analyze the role of forests in greenhouse gas mitigation, predicting forest 
sequestration to account for about one third of global carbon abatement within the next 
century. Tavoni et al. (2007) study the contribution of forestry management to long-term CO2 
stabilization policies, finding that increased forest sequestration could significantly lower the 
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global costs of climate policy. These studies feature a strong integration of modeling 
frameworks and form an important scientific basis for the numerical analysis of interactions 
between forestry activities and future climate policy. 
Against this background, we study the implications of crediting carbon abatement from 
reduced deforestation for the post-Kyoto carbon market. In order to quantitatively assess the 
corresponding economic impacts for industrialized and developing countries in the year 2020, 
we link two numerical simulation models at the global scale: a dynamic model of the global 
forestry sector and an equilibrium model of the world carbon market which is based on 
empirical allowance allocation. By simulating the response of the forestry sector to changes in 
future carbon prices, we generate marginal cost functions for carbon abatement from reduced 
deforestation. These cost functions are incorporated into the carbon-market model which 
covers international emissions trading on two levels: (i) on the government level, as facilitated 
by a post-Kyoto climate agreement and (ii) on the company level, as facilitated by the EU 
ETS and a future linkage to emerging schemes outside Europe. As opposed to previous 
studies, we are thus able to explicitly assess the global carbon permit trade flows generated 
from reducing deforestation. Furthermore, we analyze the so far unexplored carbon-market 
implications of uncertainties in transaction costs of forestry projects as well as the baseline 
against which reduced deforestation is measured. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the numerical 
model framework for our quantitative analysis. Section 3 specifies illustrative scenarios of 
post-Kyoto climate policy in 2020. In Section 4 we present the simulation results, and in 
Section 5 we conclude. 
 
2 Numerical model framework 
For the quantitative assessment of reducing deforestation and trading emissions in 2020 we 
subsequently present our two numerical model frameworks: a dynamic model of the forestry 
sector and a static model of the world carbon market. 
 
2.1 Modelling the forestry sector in tropical regions 
In order to simulate the response of the forestry sector to changes in future carbon prices, we 
employ the dynamic partial equilibrium model Generalized Comprehensive Mitigation 
Assessment Process GCOMAP (Sathaye et al., 2005, 2006). This model explicitly analyzes 
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the carbon benefits of forestation globally in ten regions and of reducing deforestation in four 
important tropical rainforest regions (FAO, 2007): Africa, South-East Asia, Central America 
and South America. It establishes a reference case level of land use, absent carbon prices, for 
2000 to 2100 before simulating the response of forest land users (i.e. farmers) to changes in 
prices in forest land and products, as well as prices emerging in carbon markets. The model’s 
objective is to estimate the land area that land users would plant above the reference case 
level, or prevent from being deforested, in response to carbon prices. As a result GCOMAP 
estimates the net changes in carbon stocks while meeting the annual demand for timber and 
non-timber products.  
In order to assess the role of institutional barriers for crediting carbon abatement from 
reducing deforestation we investigate the impact of transaction costs of forestry projects and 
programs (hereafter also referred to as projects) on the carbon-price response of the forestry 
sector (see Antinori and Sathaye, 2007). Such transaction costs may arise from project search, 
feasibility studies, as well as negotiation, monitoring and verification, regulatory approval, 
and insurance costs. Antinori and Sathaye (2007) analyze four data sets of forestry and energy 
projects including projects associated with the CDM and the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF). In each data set, they find strong economies of scale. The forestry project sizes range 
from 58 thousand to as much as 22 million tons of CO2 mitigated over their life and include 
both forestation and deforestation projects. Project lifetimes range from five to 100 years. The 
estimated transaction costs range from 0.05 US$ per ton of CO2 for large projects to 1.22 US$ 
per ton of CO2 for smaller ones. For this study, we conduct Monte-Carlo simulations of 
carbon stock changes resulting from a sequence of carbon prices in 2020 that are subject to 
the spread of transaction costs determined for the forestry sub-group of projects in the 
Antinori and Sathaye (2007) study. 
Moreover, we analyze the implications of the baseline against which reduced deforestation is 
measured for the level of carbon abatement in the forestry sector. As in the case of transaction 
costs we employ Monte-Carlo simulations of carbon stock changes resulting from a sequence 
of carbon prices for an interval of deforestation baseline levels for the tropical rainforest 
region South America. Data for annual variation in deforestation rates was available only for 
the Brazilian Amazon from 1989 to 2006, and hence we use these variations to simulate the 
potential variation in deforested area for the baseyear (INPE, 2007). 
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2.2 Modelling the global carbon market 
In order to quantitatively assess the emissions-market impacts of reducing deforestation we 
employ a numerical multi-country, two-sector partial equilibrium model of the global carbon 
market in 2020. For each region, the model incorporates calibrated marginal abatement cost 
functions for energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors. Building on the modelling 
framework of Anger (2007), it represents parallel carbon markets for (i) companies covered 
by the EU ETS and emerging schemes outside Europe as well as (ii) post-Kyoto governments 
in 2020 and accounts for emissions reductions via the CDM. The objective of the model is to 
minimize compliance costs of carbon regulation by means of international emissions trading. 
An algebraic model summary is given in Anger (2007). 
To generate marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions by region and sector we use data 
simulated by the well-known energy-system model POLES (Criqui et al., 1999), which 
explicitly covers energy technology options for emissions abatement in various world regions 
and sectors for the baseyear 2020. In the POLES simulations a sequence of carbon taxes (e.g. 
0 to 100 US$ per ton of carbon) is imposed on the respective regions, resulting in associated 
sectoral emissions abatement. The coefficients for MAC functions in 2020 are estimated by 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of tax levels (i.e. marginal abatement costs) on 
associated emissions abatement. Following Böhringer et al. (2005), in order to assure for 
functional flexibility a polynomial of third degree is chosen as the functional form of MAC 
functions.1 For region r and sector i this results in the following equation (note that EIS and 
NEIS denote energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors, respectively): 
2 3
1, 0 2, 0 3, 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir ir irMAC e e e e e e eβ β β− = − + − + −   (1) 
with irMAC  as marginal abatement cost in region r  and sector { },i EIS NEIS∈ , 1,irβ , 2,irβ  
and 3,irβ  as marginal abatement cost coefficients, ire0  as baseline emissions level in 2020 and 
ire  as emissions level after abatement. Table 3 in Appendix A.1 shows the resulting least-
square estimates of MAC coefficients by region and sector in 2020.2 
MAC functions for reducing deforestation are generated by imposing a sequence of carbon 
prices (here: 0 to 100 US$ per ton of carbon) in four tropical rainforest regions with the 
                                                 
1 We use the OLS approach as a standard estimation technique, which for our data yields parameter estimations 
with a high overall goodness-of-fit. Clearly alternative estimation approaches and functional forms could be 
chosen here. 
2 The marginal abatement cost coefficients have the following units:  
1,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/MtCO2], 2,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)2] and 3,irβ  [(€2005/tCO2)/(MtCO2)3]. 
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GCOMAP model: Africa, South-East Asia, Central America and South America. This results 
in a sequence of regional net carbon stock changes and the corresponding carbon emissions 
reductions due to avoided deforestation. Based on these price-quantity pairs we are able to 
estimate the coefficients of regional MAC functions in 2020 by means of an OLS regression. 
Regarding transaction costs of forestry projects, we establish a triangular distribution of 
transaction costs with respect to the size of the project or program. Size is defined as the 
amount of carbon dioxide that is mitigated over the life of the project or program. We report 
the results for the 5th and 95th percentile values (implying high and low transaction costs) 
from the Monte-Carlo simulations of carbon stock changes for a sequence of carbon prices in 
2020 and estimate the respective cost functions. Finally, these MAC coefficients are 
implemented into the carbon market model by covering tropical rainforest areas as explicit 
model regions. Within this linked model framework, tropical rainforest regions may export 
emissions reduction credits from reducing deforestation to industrialized model regions via 
the global carbon market. Table 4 in Appendix A.1 presents the estimated marginal abatement 
cost coefficients for avoided deforestation (in the cases of high and low transaction costs) for 
the four tropical regions in 2020. 
 
2.3 Incorporating carbon market data 
We incorporate three further inputs into the carbon market model: baseline emissions, 
emissions reduction commitments and allowance allocation associated with a potential post-
Kyoto climate policy regime. Baseline, or business-as-usual (BAU), carbon dioxide emissions 
trajectories are based on van Vuuren et al. (2006) who provide a nationally downscaled 
dataset from the implementation of the global IPCC-SRES scenario B2 (IPCC, 2000) into the 
environmental assessment model IMAGE 2.2.  
 
Emissions reduction targets 
In order to analyze future climate policy scenarios we first have to assume regional emissions 
reduction commitments for the year 2020. Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries 
(listed in Annex B of the agreement) committed to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 
percent on average during 2008-2012 as compared to 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1997). The EU 
Kyoto target of eight percent was then redistributed by an internal Burden Sharing Agreement 
among EU Member States (EU, 1999). Motivated by its ambitious current climate policy 
goals the EU is assumed to commit to a 20 percent emissions reduction versus 1990 levels in 
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2020 (EU, 2007a). We adopt the burden-sharing approach also for this ambitious future EU 
target, so that the aggregate EU commitment of effectively 27.2 percent versus business-as-
usual emissions levels in 2020 implies very heterogeneous effective reduction targets across 
EU Member States. Given the leadership role of current European climate policy, non-EU 
regions are assumed to commit to less stringent emissions targets. Canada and Japan, who 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol early, both assume a 20 percent effective reduction target 
versus business-as-usual emissions levels in 2020. The recent Kyoto-ratifier Australia and the 
non-ratifier United States commit to an effective reduction target of 15 percent versus BAU. 
Having received excess emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol, the Former Soviet Union 
is assumed to hold its emissions constant in 2020, so that the phenomenon of “Hot Air” is not 
existent.3  
For non-Annex B regions no emissions reduction commitments are assumed, as developing 
countries have so far refrained from assuming any quantified targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol. As the inclusion of these countries under the CDM or a regime crediting reduced 
deforestation requires a baseline, all developing regions are assigned their BAU emissions. 
Table 6 in Appendix A.1 lists regional carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry for 
1990 (the reference year of the Kyoto commitments), as well as projected emissions for 2010 
(the central year of the first Kyoto compliance period) and 2020. The table further shows the 
resulting emissions reduction requirements in 2010 and 2020 versus 1990 emissions levels, as 
well as the effective reduction requirements in 2020 versus BAU emissions levels in 2020.4  
 
Emissions trading schemes and the allocation of allowances 
As the most prominent instrument of current European climate policy, the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) is operating at the installation level in a “warm-up” phase since 2005 
(EU, 2003). An important characteristic of the scheme is the exclusive coverage of energy-
intensive companies. More recently, the EU has proposed to strengthen the European ETS by 
linking the scheme to emerging trading systems beyond Europe in order to achieve its climate 
policy objectives more cost-efficiently (EU, 2007c). At the same time, several non-EU 
countries such as Canada, Japan, Australia and the United States are contemplating the set up 
of domestic ETS with the intention of linking up to the EU ETS (see CEPA Environmental 
                                                 
3 Our assumption of an existing binding international agreement in 2020 building on the Kyoto Protocol 
abstracts from long-term stability aspects of such agreements. For a comprehensive introduction into related 
game-theoretic approaches to international environmental agreements see Finus (2001). 
4 Note that in our analysis Australia is approximated by the model region Pacific OECD. 
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Registry, 2005; Japanese Ministry of the Environment, 2004; Point Carbon, 2006; RGGI, 
2007). As these schemes are also expected to cover mainly energy-intensive companies, the 
EU ETS may form the nucleus for a gradually expanding global emissions trading system for 
energy-intensive industries.  
A central input for our policy assessment is the allocation of emissions allowances for EU 
Member States and linking candidates, which specifies an overall cap on emissions for those 
installations covered by the respective trading schemes. Here, we assume that the EU 
continues its predominant grandfathering method (i.e. the free allocation of allowances) to the 
covered installations in 2020. Numerically, emissions allocation can be described by so-called 
allocation factors, i.e. the fraction of baseline emissions that are freely allocated as 
allowances. In order to derive allocation factors for EU Member States in 2020 we build on 
empirical allocation data for the second trading period of the EU ETS (2008 to 2012) as 
published in the National Allocation Plan of each Member State and on recent emissions 
projections for 2010 (EU, 2007b). For the future trading period in 2020, we assume that the 
relative allowance allocation is decreased by 20 percent as compared to the second trading 
period.5 This yields regional EU allocation factors ranging between 0.55 (Spain) and 0.85 
(Sweden), implying emissions reduction requirements for the covered sectors between 45 and 
15 percent versus BAU emissions, respectively.  
In consistence with our national climate policy targets in 2020, non-EU regions also exhibit a 
less stringent allowance allocation than the EU for sectors covered by their emissions trading 
schemes: the early Kyoto-ratifiers Japan and Canada implement an allocation factor of 0.80, 
while the recent ratifier Australia and the non-ratifier United States allocate emissions 
allowances based on a factor of 0.85 in 2020. For the Former Soviet Union we assume an 
allocation factor equal to one in 2020, consistently implying no allocation of excess permits to 
installations covered by a domestic ETS.6 Table 7 summarizes all resulting allocation factors 
for EU and non-EU regions.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Two limitations apply here: Due to lacking information for Bulgaria and Romania, for these countries we start 
from an allocation factor equal to one in the second trading period. Moreover, allocation factors are chosen so 
that emissions reductions of the covered sectors do not exceed the respective national reduction requirement (this 
applies to the regions Greece, Sweden and Central Europe).  
6 Excess emissions permits (so-called “Hot Air”) are due to lower projected baseline emissions than the target 
level implied by the Former Soviet Union’s reduction commitment in 2020. We abstract from “Hot Air” here, as 
a grandfathered allowance allocation of “Hot Air” would imply an indirect subsidy for installations of this region 
(the allocated permits could be directly exported to other ETS regions). It is not unambiguous if such an ETS 
design may prevail or even be linked to an EU scheme. 
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3 Climate policy scenarios 
The post-Koyto carbon market is expected to feature international emissions trading on two 
levels: (i) on the government level, as facilitated by the Kyoto Protocol and a potential post-
Kyoto climate policy agreement and (ii) on the company level, as facilitated by the EU ETS 
and emerging schemes outside Europe. As the linked ETS are also expected to be restricted to 
energy-intensive industries, national Annex B governments may engage in country-level 
emissions trading as facilitated by a post-Kyoto agreement in order to represent their 
remaining, non-energy-intensive industries on the future carbon market (Anger, 2007). 
In the following we specify scenarios of international emissions trading in the framework of a 
post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. The scenarios can be classified by two dimensions: the 
regional dimension distinguishes scenarios of countries participating in international 
emissions trading, whereas the institutional dimension lays out alternative designs of carbon 
regulation. Table 1 presents our three regional scenarios: as a reference case, scenario EU 
represents EU ETS participants in 2020, i.e. current members of the European Union 
including the recently acceded countries Bulgaria and Romania.7 Scenario EU+ indicates 
carbon trading among countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol relatively early: EU 
Member States, Japan, Canada and the Former Soviet Union. Scenario EU++ assumes that not 
only Kyoto ratifiers trade carbon emissions among each other, but also countries that have 
only recently or not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol: Australia and the United States. For all 
regional scenarios alike five central developing countries are assumed to host CDM projects, 
representing major suppliers on the CDM carbon market (World Bank, 2006): China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Korea.8 Moreover, we include four tropical rainforest regions that 
are eligible for generating tradable offset credits for carbon abatement from reduced 
deforestation: Africa, South-East Asia, Central America and South America. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note that the region EU-27 is approximated by EU-15 Member States (excluding Luxemburg) and the POLES 
model region Central Europe, which essentially covers new Member States as well as Bulgaria and Romania. 
8 The present analysis focuses on the CDM as a project-based mechanism, as JI projects are hosted by Annex B 
parties who participate in international emissions trading. Abstracting from its project-based character, JI may 
therefore be represented by international emissions trading of the respective regions. 
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Table 1: Regional scenarios for 2020 
Regional scenario Regions participating in 
emissions trading 
CDM regions Tropical 
rainforest regions 
EU EU-27 
EU+ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Former Soviet Union 
EU++ 
EU-27 
Japan 
Canada 
Former Soviet Union 
Pacific OECD 
United States 
Brazil 
China 
India  
Mexico 
South Korea 
Africa 
South-East Asia 
Central America 
South America 
 
Table 2 lists our institutional scenarios, which involve four cases. Scenario Emissions Trading 
denotes international emissions trading among industrialized regions on two levels. On the 
first level, it represents company-based emissions trading within linked EU and non-EU 
emissions trading schemes, assuming the sectoral emissions allocation in 2020 as laid out in 
the previous section. Here, we approximate emissions trading at the company level by trading 
at the sectoral level. Moreover, all regions that have not (yet) set up an emissions trading 
scheme are assumed to comply with their emissions reduction target by cost-efficient 
domestic emissions regulation, imposing a uniform carbon tax on their entire economy. On its 
second level, scenario Emissions Trading represents parallel government trading under a post-
Kyoto Protocol, which for the sake of illustration only applies to the linked ETS regions. In 
such a setting of coexisting emissions trading regimes, a reasonable assumption is that no 
double regulation of energy-intensive industries covered by a national ETS takes place. As 
carbon trading among linked ETS is approximated by emissions trading among energy-
intensive sectors (EIS), government trading only applies to the remaining, non-energy-
intensive sectors (NEIS) of each region. These parallel government trading activities should 
be interpreted as national authorities representing their non-energy-intensive industries on the 
carbon market.9  
 
 
                                                 
9 Here it is assumed that each ETS region has committed to a post-Kyoto agreement enabling government 
emissions trading. 
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Table 2: Institutional scenarios for 2020 
CO2 regulation 
International 
emissions trading 
CDM 
access 
REDD 
access 
Forestry 
transact-
ion costs Institutional 
scenario 
EIS NEIS EIS    with 
NEIS 
with EIS and NEIS 
Emissions Trading No No - 
CDM Yes No - 
Deforestation_highTC Yes Yes high 
Deforestation_lowTC 
Permits Permits foreign EIS 
foreign 
NEIS 
Yes Yes low 
 
Considering the access to low-cost abatement options in developing countries, scenario CDM 
represents scenario Emissions Trading including the option of unlimited CDM offset credit 
imports by Annex B regions from undertaking CDM projects in non-Annex-B regions. In this 
setting, both companies covered by linked emissions trading schemes and post-Kyoto 
governments (i.e. all sectors of the economy) have access to CDM credits.10 
The model considers the following barriers to CDM projects: first, it features transaction costs 
for the purchase of CDM credits of 0.5 US$ (1 US$) per ton of CO2 for energy-intensive (non 
energy-intensive) sectors of developing countries.11 Second, following Böhringer and Löschel 
(2008) country-specific investment risk for CDM projects, e.g. from country and project risks, 
is derived by region-specific bond-yield spreads between long-term government bonds of the 
respective developing country and the United States (as a risk-free reference region). It is 
assumed that investors are risk-neutral and discount the value of emissions reduction credits 
generated by CDM projects with the mean risk value of the respective host country. The 
underlying data stems from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial 
Statistics (IMF, 2000). Third, a CDM adaptation tax is incorporated amounting to two percent 
of CDM revenues as proposed under the Marrakech Accords (UNFCCC, 2002). CDM 
transaction costs, investment risk and the CDM tax enter the model via a premium on 
                                                 
10 The amending directive linking the EU ETS with the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms grants 
European companies to generate emissions reductions via the CDM and use the associated credits as a substitute 
for EU allowances (EU, 2004). 
11 The magnitude of transaction costs is in line with recent estimates (see Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). 
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marginal abatement costs of CDM host countries, thereby increasing the international CDM 
credit price.12 
Finally, the two scenarios Deforestation_highTC and Deforestation_lowTC represent scenario 
CDM including the access for all sectors of industrialized economies to carbon abatement 
options in tropical rainforest regions. These scenarios consider all institutional barriers to 
offset crediting as mentioned above. By reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD) the four tropical regions may export carbon-offset credits to Annex B 
regions. As noted in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the two scenarios are distinguished by assuming 
high and low transaction costs of forestry projects, respectively. This is the most integrated 
climate policy scenario, facilitating not only CDM access but also international trading of 
offset credits from reduced deforestation on the carbon market. 
In the following, alternative scenario combinations of the regional and institutional climate 
policy dimension are implemented in the carbon-market model. For example, scenario 
combination CDM [EU+] represents linked emissions trading schemes and government 
emissions trading among EU+ regions including CDM access for all sectors of the 
participating economies, while all other regions fulfil their emissions reduction targets by 
cost-efficient domestic action only. 
 
4 Simulation results 
In this section we simulate the impacts of reducing deforestation and trading emissions on the 
post-Kyoto carbon-market in 2020 using the numerical model of the global carbon market (as 
presented in Section 2.2) that incorporates carbon abatement cost data from the numerical 
forestry model (as presented in Section 2.1). We start the discussion of results with the 
economic impacts for Annex B regions, before turning to the implications for CDM host 
countries and tropical rainforest regions. Finally, we address the implications of reduced 
deforestation for the case of more ambitious carbon constraints. All tables presenting the 
numerical simulation results are compiled in Appendix A.2. 
 
 
                                                 
12 An alternative approach to account for barriers to CDM project development is presented in Kallbekken et al. 
(2006), who introduce a “participation rate” reflecting that only some share of the potentially profitable CDM 
projects will be implemented. 
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4.1 Impacts on the international permit price 
Emissions trading among Annex B regions 
Focusing first on the emissions market equilibrium in 2020 in the absence of developing 
countries, Table 8 in the Appendix shows that for Annex B carbon trading (institutional 
scenario Emissions Trading) the permit price crucially depends on the regional scenario and 
differs between energy-intensive sectors (EIS) and non-energy-intensive sectors (NEIS). The 
table shows that for emissions trading among EU Member States only (regional scenario EU) 
the carbon price amounts to roughly 55 € per ton of CO2 in EIS covered by the EU ETS, 
whereas it results in 248 € on the parallel carbon market for EU governments that represent 
their NEIS. Generally, the sectoral permit price is determined both by the stringency of 
emissions reduction requirements and marginal abatement costs in the respective industries. 
Since in our case the EU carbon constraints on energy-intensive sectors (as imposed by the 
allocation factors within the EU ETS) and non-energy-intensive industries (as imposed by the 
effective national reduction requirement) are comparable, it is the more costly abatement 
options in European NEIS that lead to a much higher carbon price than in EIS.13 
By including Canada, Japan and the Former Soviet Union on the carbon market (yielding 
regional scenario EU+), the international permit price substantially decreases to 28 € and 89 € 
per ton of CO2 in the two sectors. In this setting, the three non-EU regions can trade carbon 
permits with European economies both within linked emissions trading schemes (among EIS) 
and on the post-Kyoto government carbon market (among NEIS). The lower carbon price 
originates from two sources. First, despite of the relatively costly emissions abatement options 
in Japan and Canada, their comparably low national reduction targets and loose allowance 
allocation to energy-intensive industries results in relatively low levels of marginal abatement 
costs in EIS and NEIS.14 This limits the permit demand of these two regions on the carbon 
market. Second, as a region in economic transition the Former Soviet Union features 
relatively low-cost abatement options as compared to the EU, Japan and Canada. It thus 
represents a major supplier of carbon permits on the linked emissions market by reducing 
emissions below BAU levels. Note that we abstract from the allocation of potential excess 
permits to the covered ETS companies in the Former Soviet Union, so that the lower permit 
price in scenario EU+ only originates from low-cost abatement options in this region.  
                                                 
13 For regional allocation factors and effective national reduction requirements see again Table 6 and Table 7. 
14 An assessment of marginal abatement costs across OECD countries is presented in Criqui et al. (1999). 
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Figure 1 illustrates that establishing the most integrated emissions trading system including 
Australia and the United States (regional scenario EU++) causes the carbon price to decrease 
further in 2020, resulting in 19 € and 78 € per ton of CO2. These efficiency gains on the 
enlarged carbon market originate from an increased supply of emissions permit by Australia 
and the United States, who impose the lowest national reduction targets and highest relative 
allowance allocation to their energy-intensive industries. Furthermore the United States 
feature relatively low-cost abatement options. Consequently, the two regions exhibit marginal 
abatement cost levels that are lower than the permit price on the original emissions market 
(regional scenario EU+) and thus join the Former Soviet Union as carbon permit exporters – 
both within linked emissions trading schemes and on the post-Kyoto government carbon 
market. However, in all regional settings of institutional scenario Emissions Trading the 
parallel carbon markets of EIS and NEIS are still separated (and sectoral permit prices 
different), as international trading is feasible only between the same sectors of the 
participating economies. 
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Figure 1: International carbon permit price for regional scenario EU++ by sector and institutional 
scenario (€2005 per ton CO2) 
 
 
Crediting carbon abatement via the CDM 
Generating emissions reduction credits in developing countries via CDM projects may serve 
as a substitute for emissions permits traded between industrial countries. Figure 1 presents an 
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interesting pattern of permit prices arising from CDM access for Annex B countries (see 
institutional scenario CDM). First it shows that the access to low-cost abatement in 
developing countries drastically decreases the permit price in the most integrated emissions 
market to roughly 13 € per ton of CO2. As the resulting permit price is lower than both 
sectoral carbon price levels on the original Annex B market, this yields a sectorally uniform 
carbon price which de facto interconnects the formerly separated carbon markets of linked 
emissions trading schemes (among EIS) and post-Kyoto governments (among NEIS). The 
CDM thus yields not only large efficiency gains by decreasing the permit price, but 
establishes full where-flexibility of carbon abatement between sectors and regions. Moreover, 
the carbon price decreases more in the high-cost NEIS by CDM, underlining the economic 
importance of CDM access for Annex B governments. Table 8 in the Appendix finally shows 
that in the case of CDM access the carbon price is the higher, the more Annex B parties are 
involved in international emissions trading (i.e. lowest in a purely EU trading regime). 
Clearly, the increased number of participants on the carbon market with higher marginal 
abatement costs than developing countries drive up the CDM credit demand from EIS and 
NEIS and thereby increase the carbon price level.   
 
Crediting carbon abatement from reduced deforestation 
When the import of low-cost carbon abatement from developing countries is not only feasible 
via the CDM but also by crediting carbon abatement from avoided deforestation, the 
international permit price further decreases. Figure 1 shows that even when accounting for 
high transaction costs of forestry projects, issuing tradable carbon-offset credits for avoided 
deforestation reduces the sectorally uniform carbon price by more than 40 percent in 2020. 
The resulting price level amounts to less than 8 € per ton of CO2 on the EU++ carbon market 
(see scenario Deforestation_highTC). The reason is that the relatively low returns of land use 
and forest products in tropical regions imply a low opportunity cost of reducing deforestation, 
so that its marginal abatement costs are lower than the incremental costs of conventional 
carbon abatement options in CDM host countries. The higher level of competition on the 
supply side of the emissions market thus decreases the international permit price. In the 
following sections we will see how the possibility of exporting carbon-offset credits from 
reduced deforestation for tropical rainforest regions affects the competitive position of CDM 
host countries on the carbon market. Furthermore, Figure 1 suggests that the carbon price 
differences between the cases of high and low transaction costs amount to roughly 5 percent 
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(carbon prices of 7.6 and 7.2 € per ton of CO2, respectively). Regarding the permit price 
impacts in alternative regional trading constellations, Table 8 in the Appendix shows that – as 
in the case of CDM access for Annex B countries – the carbon price will be the higher, the 
more Annex B parties are involved in international emissions trading (ranging from 5 to 8 € 
per ton of CO2 across regional scenarios).  
 
4.2 Emissions reductions and permit trade flows 
In the following we assess the regional emissions reductions and permit flows on the global 
carbon market for our alternative climate policy scenarios. Table 10 in the Appendix presents 
the associated numerical simulation results. It shows that domestic reductions of Annex B 
carbon emissions generally decrease for regionally enlarged international emissions trading 
and are substantially diminished when industrialized countries are granted access to carbon-
offset credits via the CDM. Clearly these effects correspond to the decreasing permit price 
across scenarios, diminishing the incentives for domestic carbon abatement. We find that 
integrating reduced deforestation further cuts Annex B emissions reductions and induces large 
abatement efforts in tropical rainforest regions. On the most integrated carbon market 
(regional scenario EU++) Africa reduces almost two thirds of its carbon emissions from 
deforestation – even when accounting for high transaction costs – followed by Central and 
South America (16 and 15 percent reduction) and South-East Asia (8 percent).15  
These regional emissions abatement patterns translate into international permit flows on the 
post-Kyoto carbon market. For transparency abstracting from emissions trading among Annex 
B regions only, Figure 2 illustrates imports and exports of carbon-offset credits on the most 
integrated emissions market (regional scenario EU++). It shows that the aggregate Annex B 
region imports more than one gigaton of CO2 from low-cost abatement options in CDM host 
countries. Moreover, Annex B imports of CDM credits are much higher in non-energy-
intensive sectors that feature more costly abatement options (see Table 10 for trade flows at 
the sectoral level). We find that industrialized regions increase their imports of carbon-offset 
credits by more than 40 percent when, additional to the CDM, reduced deforestation is 
included into international emissions trading. The volume of offset-credit imports is even 
higher when transaction costs of forestry projects are low.  
                                                 
15 Note than in the table, emissions reductions of the four tropical rainforest regions only refer to reduced 
deforestation. 
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Figure 2: Offset credit exports (positive) and imports (negative) by region and scenario (Mt CO2)  
 
Figure 2 further illustrates that crediting carbon abatement from reduced deforestation is 
disadvantageous for traditional CDM host countries that feature only conventional abatement 
options. When tropical rainforest regions increase the supply of low-cost carbon abatement on 
the emissions market, aggregate permit exports of CDM regions decrease by roughly 50 
percent. In this case, Africa represents the dominant supplier on the carbon market, featuring a 
larger export volume than all CDM regions together (amounting to almost one gigaton of 
CO2). Among the regions reducing deforestation, Africa is followed by South America and 
South-East Asia in terms of credit-export volume. Finally, Figure 2 suggests that the export 
activity of tropical regions is more pronounced in the case of low forestry transaction costs: 
for Africa, offset-credit exports are almost ten percent higher. 
 
4.3 Compliance costs and benefits from carbon trading 
Economic impacts for industrialized regions 
In the following we assess the overall compliance costs of carbon regulation and the potential 
benefits from reducing deforestation and trading emissions in 2020. Focusing first on 
industrialized countries, Figure 3 shows the resulting compliance costs for regional 
constellation EU++ associated with fulfilling the national Annex B emissions reduction targets 
across institutional scenarios (all numerical results are compiled in Table 11 of the Appendix). 
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Reflecting the sectorally heterogeneous marginal abatement cost levels and permit prices 
under pure Annex B emissions trading, we find that economic adjustment costs of NEIS 
amount to more than three times the compliance costs of EIS.  
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Figure 3: Annex B compliance costs by sector and scenario (million €2005) 
 
The figure shows that the access to low-cost emissions abatement in CDM host countries 
decreases overall Annex B compliance costs by more than 50 percent. As the high-cost NEIS 
benefit more from project-based emissions crediting in developing countries through their 
national governments, the CDM diminishes the previous difference in sectoral economic 
burdens under pure emissions trading. Most importantly, we find that integrating avoided 
deforestation into international emissions trading induces a further substantial decrease in the 
costs of post-Kyoto climate policy. Total Annex B compliance costs fall by more than one 
third if also tropical rainforest regions may export carbon-offset credits to the industrialized 
world. As in the case of the CDM, it shows that NEIS of Annex B regions are benefiting to a 
larger extent from the access to credits from reducing deforestation than EIS, largely aligning 
the economic compliance burden of the two sectors in industrialized countries.  
Figure 3 further suggests that consistent with the permit price impact of transaction costs 
related to forestry projects, their effect on overall costs is considerable: total compliance costs 
are resulting almost five percent higher in the case of high transaction costs as compared to 
low transaction costs. Finally, the numerical results in Table 11 imply that both the beneficial 
impact of crediting reduced deforestation and the cost-increasing impact of transaction costs 
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are attenuated in the case of less integrated emissions trading systems (i.e. in regional 
scenarios EU and EU+), as the demand for carbon-offset credits is lower in these regional 
constellations.  
 
Economic impacts for developing regions 
We now turn to the overall carbon-market impacts of climate policy in 2020 for developing 
countries. For transparency focusing on institutional scenarios involving the CDM and 
reduced deforestation with high transaction costs, Figure 4 shows negative compliance costs 
(i.e. net revenues) for regions which are exporters of permits on the international carbon 
market: the five CDM host countries, the four tropical rainforest regions and, for the sake of 
illustration, also the Former Soviet Union.16  
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Figure 4: Compliance costs for developing regions by region and scenario (million €2005) 
 
For the most integrated emissions trading system (regional scenario EU++) the figure suggests 
that – consistent with the impacts on regional permit flows – including avoided deforestation 
in international emissions trading results in disadvantageous carbon-market impacts on the 
original carbon permit exporters. As soon as tropical rainforest regions may export carbon-
offset credits to the industrialized world, the Former Soviet Union and all five CDM host 
                                                 
16 Note that in the figure, the net revenues for the regions Brazil and Mexico only originate from CDM projects, 
while the numbers for Central and South America only include net revenues from reduced deforestation. For 
these regions, the carbon-market implications of the two scenarios would counteract on an aggregate level. 
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countries face substantially decreased revenues on the carbon market. While net benefits of 
the Former Soviet Union decrease by more than half, China, India and Brazil even face 
revenue losses of more than two thirds, even when accounting for high transaction costs of 
forestry projects. The increased competition on the emissions market decreases both the 
permit price and net revenues for the original permit exporters. Instead, tropical rainforest 
regions receive large net benefits from reducing deforestation, as their revenues from 
exporting the associated carbon-offset credits exceed their abatement costs in terms of 
foregone revenues from land use and forest product sales. Figure 4 indicates that the impact of 
avoided deforestation on the carbon market is large enough for Africa to replace China as the 
most benefiting permit supplier.   
 
4.4 The role of the deforestation baseline 
The economic implications of crediting forest conservation may be substantially influenced 
by the baseline against which the reductions in deforestation are measured. Obviously, higher 
deforestation baselines ceteris paribus imply higher levels of credited carbon abatement and 
vice versa. In this section we investigate this issue by simulating net carbon stock changes for 
alternative deforestation baselines with the numerical model of the forestry sector described in 
Section 2.1. For the sake of illustration we focus on alternative baselines for one exemplary 
tropical rainforest region, South America, assume CDM access for Annex B regions and 
median transaction cost values of forestry projects. From the results of Monte-Carlo 
simulations we choose the 5th and 95th percentile values (implying low and high 
deforestation baselines) of carbon stock changes for a sequence of carbon prices in 2020 and 
estimate the alternative marginal abatement cost coefficients for South America by the 
procedure described in Section 2.2. The resulting cost coefficients are presented in Table 5 of 
the Appendix. 
Table 9 in the Appendix presents the resulting carbon-market implications in terms of the 
carbon price emerging from low and high deforestation baselines (scenarios 
Deforestation_lowBase and Deforestation_highBase). The simulation results show that a high 
baseline of South America results in an international permit price that is more than five 
percent lower than for a low baseline of deforestation. Clearly, the higher volume of 
generated carbon-offset credits supplied to the carbon market for a high deforestation baseline 
leads to a decrease in the permit price. Figure 5 illustrates how these carbon price impacts 
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translate into changes in trade flows of emissions permits for the most integrated emissions 
trading system. 
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Figure 5: Offset credit exports (positive) and imports (negative) by region and scenario (Mt CO2)  
 
While industrialized countries import slightly more carbon-offset credits from the developing 
world in the case of a high deforestation baseline, traditional CDM host countries face lower 
permit exports due to the larger supply of low-cost carbon credits on the emissions market. 
Most importantly, South America’s exports of carbon-offset credits to Annex B countries are 
more than 80 percent higher for a high deforestation baseline, causing the permit exports of 
the competing tropical rainforest regions Africa, South-East Asia and Central America to drop 
by five to eight percent. These results are underlined by the emissions reductions in Table 12 
of the Appendix, implying that South America almost features double the amount of 
abatement from reduced deforestation for a high baseline. 
Table 12 further shows that South America receives more than 50 percent higher net revenues 
from avoiding deforestation and exporting the associated offset credits in the case of a high 
baseline, while the three remaining tropical rainforest regions face lower benefits on the 
carbon market. Moreover, the simulations results across regional scenarios imply that the 
economic differences between high and low deforestation baselines become more pronounced 
in more integrated regional emissions trading constellations, as then both the international 
permit demand and the carbon price are higher. We conclude that uncertainties in 
deforestation baselines play an important role for the carbon market, even when concerning a 
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single region only. However, our results suggest that while alternative baseline levels of one 
region do affect the economic impacts for the remaining rainforest regions via the carbon 
market, they are most substantial for the respective region itself.  
 
4.5 Tightening Annex B carbon constraints 
The previous sections showed that crediting carbon abatement from reduced deforestation 
represents an important mechanism for cost-efficient climate policy. However, the low-cost 
carbon abatement option of reduced deforestation may not only improve economic efficiency 
for the achievement of given global carbon constraints. It may also increase environmental 
effectiveness by enabling industrialized countries to tighten their carbon regulation at a given 
level of mitigation costs. In the following, we analyze this role of tropical forest conservation 
in greater detail. 
We start with a more ambitious climate policy setting by suggesting more stringent carbon 
constraints of Annex B regions in 2020: as compared to the national emissions reduction 
targets presented in Section 2.3, industrialized countries are assumed to decrease their 
national emissions budgets granted by a post-Kyoto agreement by five percent. Consistently, 
we also tighten regional allocation factors within domestic emissions trading schemes by five 
percent. In the following, we compare two policy cases: (i) the original carbon constraints as 
presented in Section 2.3 including only CDM access for Annex B countries and (ii) five 
percent tighter carbon constraints including additional Annex B access to carbon-offset credits 
from reduced deforestation. Table 13 in the Appendix presents the resulting compliance costs 
by region and scenario. We find that for the most integrated emissions trading system 
(regional scenario EU++) total compliance costs of the aggregate Annex B region result in 
comparable levels for case (i) and case (ii), amounting to 26.3 and 25.9 billion € respectively, 
even when accounting for high transaction costs of forestry projects. The access to carbon-
offset credits from reduced deforestation enables the industrialized world to tighten its carbon 
constraints substantially at similar levels of mitigation costs.  
However, Table 13 implies that these comparable effects on the aggregate Annex B level 
originate from heterogeneous cost effects across regions. While permit importers benefit from 
the access to low-cost abatement options from reducing deforestation despite of the stricter 
emissions reduction targets, those Annex B regions exporting permits to others (such as 
Eastern European economies or the Former Soviet Union) face higher compliance costs in 
case (ii). For these countries, the combination of lower revenues from permit sales (due to the 
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higher aggregate permit supply) and stricter reduction targets results in economic losses. 
Moreover, we find divergent impacts of tightening Annex B carbon constraints at the sectoral 
level: while for energy-intensive industries the cost-increasing tightening of allowance 
allocation within linked ETS cannot be compensated by the access to offset credits from 
reducing deforestation, non-energy-intensive sectors experience a beneficial effect in regional 
scenario EU++.  
In less integrated emissions trading systems (regional scenarios EU and EU+) total 
compliance costs are substantially even lower for the respective participants in the case of 
stricter climate policy and the access to carbon abatement from reduced deforestation. In these 
regional constellations the global demand for carbon-offset credits is lower, so that the cost-
decreasing impact of reduced deforestation is stronger. This effect is underlined by Table 14 
in the Appendix, which shows lower carbon prices for less integrated trading scenarios. An 
international climate regime with less Annex B participants could thus tighten regional carbon 
constraints by an even greater extent than five percent at constant mitigation costs, when the 
access to carbon abatement from reduced deforestation is facilitated.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Among future strategies to combat global warming, the reduction of tropical deforestation and 
the preservation of carbon-absorbing rainforests have gained increasing attention. This paper 
quantitatively assessed the implications of crediting carbon abatement from reduced 
deforestation for the global emissions market in 2020. In the framework of a post-Kyoto 
climate policy agreement, tropical rainforest regions would be able to export carbon-offset 
credits from reduced deforestation to the industrialized world. For our quantitative assessment 
we linked a numerical multi-country equilibrium model of the global carbon market with a 
dynamic model of the forestry sector by explicitly incorporating marginal cost functions of 
carbon abatement from reduced deforestation.  
The simulation results show that integrating avoided deforestation into international emissions 
trading substantially decreases the costs of post-Kyoto climate policy. We find that the 
international carbon permit price is almost halved due to the low-cost credit supply from 
tropical rainforest regions. Consequently, total compliance costs for industrialized countries 
are decreased by more than one third if tropical rainforest regions may export carbon-offset 
credits to the industrialized world – even when accounting for conventional low-cost 
abatement options in developing countries via the CDM. Decomposition of these effects at the 
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sectoral level shows that the compliance cost savings from crediting reduced deforestation are 
more substantial for non-energy-intensive sectors of Annex B countries, as these industries 
originally feature relatively high marginal abatement costs.  
At the same time, tropical rainforest regions receive substantial net revenues from exporting 
carbon-offset credits from reducing deforestation to the industrialized world. However, as a 
consequence of including forestry management in the carbon market CDM host countries face 
decreasing revenues due to the increased competition for carbon-offset credit supply. 
Regarding international permit flows, we find that Africa represents the dominant supplier of 
carbon-offset credits from avoiding deforestation, reducing emissions from deforestation by 
roughly two thirds and exporting almost one gigatonne of CO2. Africa is followed by South 
America, South-East Asia and Central America as secondary carbon credit exporters.  
Regarding institutional barriers to reducing deforestation, we find that transaction costs of 
forestry projects arising from search, negotiation or insurance costs increase the international 
carbon price to a considerable extent. High levels of transaction costs may thus decrease the 
permit export activity of tropical rainforest regions, thereby increasing Annex B compliance 
costs by almost five percent. Furthermore, we show that the impact of forestry transaction 
costs generally increases with the number of Annex B countries participating in international 
emissions trading due to the higher global demand for carbon-offset credits.  
The economic implications of crediting carbon abatement from avoided deforestation may be 
substantially influenced by the baseline against which the reductions in deforestation are 
measured. Simulating the economic implications for the case of South America, we find that 
deforestation baselines play an important role for the carbon market – even when concerning 
only a single region. South America almost doubles its exports of carbon-offset credits and 
receives more than 50 percent higher net revenues on the carbon market in the case of a high 
deforestation baseline. A higher baseline of one region also affects the economic impacts for 
others via the carbon market: both the remaining tropical rainforest regions and traditional 
CDM host countries exhibit lower permit exports.  
Finally, the low-cost carbon abatement option of reduced deforestation may not only improve 
economic efficiency for the achievement of given global carbon constraints: it may also 
increase environmental effectiveness by enabling Annex B countries to strengthen their 
carbon regulation. Our simulation results show that crediting carbon abatement from reduced 
deforestation enables the industrialized world to tighten its carbon constraints by at least five 
percent – at constant levels of mitigation costs for post-Kyoto climate policy. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Emissions market data 
Table 3: Conventional abatement options: Marginal abatement cost coefficients in 2020 (€2005) 
β 1,EIS,r β 2,EIS,r β 3,EIS,r β 1,NEIS,r β 2,NEIS,r β 3,NEIS,r
Austria 21.1480 -3.3392 0.8094 11.4095 2.8620 -0.1012
Belgium 2.8430 -0.0984 0.0026 5.8176 0.1881 0.0176
Denmark 11.1840 -0.5817 0.0235 59.6656 -12.7515 5.7710
Finland 3.0710 -0.0566 0.0032 75.2956 -14.0624 1.5541
France 0.9439 -0.0078 0.0002 1.5191 0.0784 -0.0007
Germany 0.3668 -0.0017 0.0000 0.9417 0.0111 0.0000
Greece 1.8843 -0.0118 0.0005 30.8964 -1.6083 0.3375
Ireland 3.0683 -0.1585 0.0110 23.4662 -0.3972 0.2788
Italy 0.9413 0.0036 0.0001 2.5992 0.1511 -0.0005
Netherlands 0.8665 0.0393 -0.0004 10.9863 -0.4063 0.1088
Portugal 11.0386 -0.5740 0.0175 56.1921 -9.2007 2.4941
Spain 0.8090 -0.0097 0.0002 10.3924 -0.4192 0.0137
Sweden 7.7433 -0.2814 0.0102 12.5684 1.7070 0.3807
United Kingdom 0.4066 -0.0022 0.0000 1.4731 0.0244 -0.0001
Central Europe 0.1466 0.0001 0.0000 0.7554 0.0008 0.0000
Canada 0.2766 0.0007 0.0000 0.8316 0.0044 0.0001
Japan 0.2666 0.0023 0.0000 1.3130 0.0313 -0.0001
Former Soviet Union 0.0218 0.0002 0.0000 0.1075 0.0004 0.0000
Pacifc OECD 0.7244 -0.0094 0.0001 1.8636 -0.0315 0.0005
United States 0.0245 0.0000 0.0000 0.1453 0.0000 0.0000
Brazil 11.5525 -0.0631 0.0001 4.1163 0.0006 0.0004
China 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.3052 -0.0004 0.0000
India 0.0960 -0.0001 0.0000 2.2685 -0.0346 0.0008
Mexico 0.0116 0.0191 -0.0001 0.3852 0.0204 -0.0001
South Korea 0.3405 -0.0011 0.0000 4.1598 -0.0027 0.0010
Regions
Energy-intensive sectors (EIS) Non-energy-intensive sectors (NEIS)
 
 
Table 4: Avoided deforestation: Marginal abatement cost coefficients in 2020 (€2005) 
β 1,r β 2,r β 3,r β 1,r β 2,r β 3,r
Africa 0.0175 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0191 -0.0001 0.0000
South-East Asia 0.2234 -0.0018 0.0000 0.1993 -0.0004 0.0000
Central America 0.2467 -0.0021 0.0000 0.2197 -0.0004 0.0000
South America 0.0303 0.0000 0.0000 0.0270 0.0000 0.0000
Regions
High transaction costs Low transaction costs
 
 
Table 5: Avoided deforestation – alternative baseline for South America: Marginal abatement cost 
coefficients in 2020 (€2005) 
β 1,r β 2,r β 3,r β 1,r β 2,r β 3,r
Africa 0.0175 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0191 -0.0001 0.0000
South-East Asia 0.2234 -0.0018 0.0000 0.1993 -0.0004 0.0000
Central America 0.2467 -0.0021 0.0000 0.2197 -0.0004 0.0000
South America 0.0158 0.0005 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0000
Regions
Low baseline High baseline
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Table 6: CO2 benchmark emissions and reduction requirements by region and year  
Regions
CO2 emissions
in 1990
(Mt CO2)
CO2 emissions
in 2010
(Mt CO2)
CO2 emissions
in 2020
(Mt CO2)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2010
(% vs. 1990)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2020
(% vs. 1990)
Reduction 
requirements in 
2020
(% vs. 2020)
Austria 59.6 73.4 74.1 13.0 24.3 39.1
Belgium 110.1 142.7 143.9 7.5 19.6 38.5
Denmark 50.4 58.6 59.1 21.0 31.3 41.4
Finland 54.2 64.7 65.2 0.0 13.0 27.7
France 377.3 418.0 421.0 0.0 13.0 22.1
Germany 988.3 954.6 963.0 21.0 31.3 29.5
Greece 75.8 105.5 106.1 -25.0 -8.7 22.3
Ireland 33.0 49.5 49.8 -13.0 1.7 34.9
Italy 417.5 508.4 511.7 6.5 18.7 33.7
Netherlands 158.5 200.3 201.8 6.0 18.3 35.8
Portugal 43.6 74.3 74.7 -27.0 -10.4 35.6
Spain 225.8 349.0 351.1 -15.0 0.0 35.7
Sweden 49.8 49.8 49.8 -4.0 9.6 9.6
United Kingdom 577.4 640.0 646.5 12.5 23.9 32.0
Central Europe 1042.1 893.2 1110.4 -4.8 8.8 14.4
Canada 427.5 597.9 602.3 6.0 -12.7 20.0
Japan 1091.4 1264.8 1168.3 6.0 14.4 20.0
Former Soviet Union 3605.4 2489.4 2764.3 0.0 23.3 0.0
Pacific OECD 292.0 449.7 446.1 (-8.0) -29.9 15.0
United States 4890.8 6410.1 6500.0 (7.0) -13.0 15.0
Brazil 214.0 567.4 838.2 - - -
China 2495.7 5038.3 6491.2 - - -
India 616.1 1764.9 2934.5 - - -
Mexico 309.0 572.4 733.7 - - -
South Korea 253.7 658.7 853.0 - - -  
Sources: Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (Van Vuuren et al., 2006), UNFCCC (1997), EU 
(2007a); own calculations 
 
Table 7: Allocation factors by region in 2010 and 2020 
Model region Allocation factor in 2010
Allocation factor 
in 2020
Austria 0.813 0.650
Belgium 0.943 0.755
Germany 0.876 0.701
Denmark 0.822 0.657
Spain 0.693 0.554
France 0.907 0.726
Finland 1.000 0.800
Greece 0.865 0.692
Ireland 0.750 0.600
Italy 0.849 0.679
Netherlands 0.893 0.715
Portugal 0.839 0.671
Sweden 1.065 0.852
United Kingdom 0.900 0.720
Central Europe 0.928 0.742
Canada - 0.800
Japan - 0.800
Former Soviet Union - 1.000
Pacific OECD - 0.850
United States - 0.850  
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A.2 Numerical simulation results 
Table 8: Core scenarios: Carbon permit price by scenario and sector in 2020 (€2005 per tCO2) 
Scenario 
Scenario Emissions Trading CDM 
 EIS NEIS EIS NEIS
[EU] 54.9 248.2 9.2 9.2 
[EU+] 27.6 88.7 10.8 10.8 
[EU++] 18.5 77.7 13.2 13.2 
Scenario 
Scenario Deforestation_highTC Deforestation_lowTC 
 EIS NEIS EIS NEIS
[EU] 5 5 4.9 4.9 
[EU+] 5.8 5.8 5.2 5.2 
[EU++] 7.6 7.6 7.2 7.2 
 
 
 
Table 9: Alternative baseline for South America: Carbon permit price by scenario and sector (€2005 
per tCO2) 
Scenario 
Scenario Deforestation_lowBase Deforestation_highBase 
 EIS NEIS EIS NEIS
[EU] 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.7 
[EU+] 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 
[EU++] 7.5 7.5 7 7 
 
 
 32
Table 10: Core scenarios: Total emissions reductions (% of BAU) and sectoral net exports of carbon-offset credits by scenario and region in 2020 (Mt CO2) 
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU] CDM [EU] Deforestation_highTC [EU] Deforestation_lowTC [EU] 
 Reduction TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
EU 54.1 0 0 8.2 -584.9 -522.6 4.6 -659.8 -539.8 4.4 -662.9 -540.6 
EU+ 35.5 0 0 11.8 -584.9 -522.6 9.9 -659.8 -539.8 9.8 -662.9 -540.6 
EU++ 33.1 0 0 19.6 -584.9 -522.6 18.5 -659.8 -539.8 18.5 -662.9 -540.6 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 26.9 378.6 27.9 392.5 
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.5 17.3 4.8 18.1 
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.6 15.1 10.1 15.8 
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.7 123 9.1 128.8 
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU
+] CDM [EU+] Deforestation_highTC [EU+] Deforestation_lowTC [EU+] 
 Reduction TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
EU 30.1 0 0 9.6 -398.4 -488.4 5.2 -537.2 -529.5 4.7 -552.6 -533.8 
EU+ 35.5 0 0 12.3 -477.8 -592.1 7.4 -659.1 -652 6.7 -682.5 -659.4 
EU++ 33.1 0 0 19.9 -477.8 -592.1 17 -659.1 -652 16.6 -682.5 -659.4 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 42.6 599.3 49.8 700.9 
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.4 20.8 5.2 19.7 
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.5 18.1 11 17.3 
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.4 147.4 9.9 140.5 
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU
++] CDM [EU++] Deforestation_highTC [EU++] Deforestation_lowTC  [EU++] 
 Reduction TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
EU 23.6 0 0 11.7 -277.9 -630.1 6.8 -573.8 -677.6 6.5 -589.9 -681.5 
EU+ 29.2 0 0 14.5 -334.9 -742 9.2 -689.6 -815.4 8.8 -711.3 -821.6 
EU++ 33.1 0 0 16.4 -368.9 -959.9 9.9 -808.6 -1066.6 9.4 -840.8 -1074.7 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 901 69.7 981.3 
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.6 28.9 7.7 29.2 
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 25.2 16.2 25.5 
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.5 205.2 14.6 207.6 
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Table 11: Core scenarios: Compliance costs by scenario, region and sector in 2020 (million €2005) 
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU] CDM [EU] Deforestation_highTC [EU] Deforestation_lowTC [EU] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 75487.6 17776.6 57711 11171.8 6166.3 5005.5 6336.1 3557.5 2778.6 6129.9 3443.9 2686 
EU+ 100954.8 21940.8 79014 36639 10330.5 26308.5 31803.3 7721.7 24081.6 31597.1 7608.1 23989 
EU++ 120949.2 25431.9 95517.3 56633.4 13821.6 42811.8 51797.7 11212.8 40584.9 51591.5 11099.2 40492.3 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1042.4   -990.1   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -54   -55.1   
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -48.2   -49.3   
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -391.9   -400.5   
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU
+] CDM [EU+] Deforestation_highTC [EU+] Deforestation_lowTC [EU+] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 50496.2 14113.6 36382.6 12915.8 7079.5 5836.3 7244.6 4055.3 3189.3 6541 3670 2871 
EU+ 38944.3 11193.3 27751 14545.6 7407.1 7138.5 8571.8 4558.4 4013.4 7787 4161.6 3625.4 
EU++ 58938.7 14684.4 44254.3 34540 10898.2 23641.8 28566.2 8049.5 20516.7 27781.4 7652.7 20128.7 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1708.3   -1585.9   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -72.9   -63.7   
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -65.1   -56.9   
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -529.1   -462.5   
Scenario 
Region Emissions Trading [EU
++] CDM [EU++] Deforestation_highTC [EU++] Deforestation_lowTC  [EU++] 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 43893.6 10827.1 33066.5 15429.9 8365.7 7064.2 9310.1 5174.6 4135.5 8852.7 4928.4 3924.3 
EU+ 37514.6 10121.9 27392.7 16985.9 8458.5 8527.4 10820.4 5669.2 5151.2 10329.6 5430.2 4899.4 
EU++ 56108.2 12835.6 43272.6 26293.2 11889.1 14404.1 17258.1 8580.8 8677.3 16503 8252.1 8250.9 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3522.7   -3705.1   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -127.7   -124   
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -114.2   -111.1   
South America 0 0 0 0 0 0 -928.7   -903.2   
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Table 12: Alternative baseline for South America: Total emissions reductions (% of BAU), sectoral net exports of carbon-offset credits and compliance costs by 
scenario and region in 2020 (Mt CO2) 
Scenario 
Region Deforestation_lowBase [EU] Deforestation_highBase [EU] Deforestation_lowBase [EU] Deforestation_highBase [EU] 
 Reduction TOTAL  
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
EU 4.5 -662 -540.4 4.3 -665.5 -541.2 6186.2 3475 2711.2 5952.4 3346.2 2606.2 
EU+ 9.8 -662 -540.4 9.8 -665.5 -541.2 31653.4 7639.2 24014.2 31419.6 7510.4 23909.2 
EU++ 18.5 -662 -540.4 18.4 -665.5 -541.2 51647.8 11130.3 40517.5 51414 11001.5 40412.5 
Africa 28 394.6 24.2 340.7 -1027.8   -886.3   
South-East Asia 4.6 17.6 4.4 16.7 -54   -49.6   
Central America 9.8 15.4 9.3 14.6 -48.2   -44.3   
South America 8.6 121.9 14.2 201.4 -412.3   -610.1   
Scenario 
Region Deforestation_lowBase [EU
+] Deforestation_highBase [EU+] Deforestation_lowBase [EU+] Deforestation_highBase [EU+] 
 Reduction TOTAL  
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
EU 5 -545.6 -531.8 4.8 -551.2 -533.2 6867.9 3849.4 3018.5 6673.5 3743 2930.5 
EU+ 7 -671.7 -655.8 6.8 -678.1 -658.1 8152.8 4347.3 3805.5 7935.5 4237.3 3698.2 
EU++ 16.8 -671.7 -655.8 16.7 -678.1 -658.1 28147.2 7838.4 20308.8 27929.9 7728.4 20201.5 
Africa 47.1 662.7 41.9 589.8 -1684.7   -1484.2   
South-East Asia 5.3 20.3 5.1 19.5 -68.1   -64   
Central America 11.3 17.7 10.8 17.1 -60.9   -57.1   
South America 9.5 134.7 16.5 234.5 -503.1   -786.4   
Scenario 
Region Deforestation_lowBase [EU
++] Deforestation_highBase [EU++] Deforestation_lowBase [EU++] Deforestation_highBase [EU++] 
 Reduction TOTAL  
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Reduction 
TOTAL 
Credit-Ex 
EIS 
Credit-Ex 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
Costs 
TOTAL 
Costs 
EIS 
Costs 
NEIS 
EU 6.7 -578.1 -679 6.2 -600.8 -683.6 9162.1 5094.9 4067.2 8598.4 4791.1 3807.3 
EU+ 9 -696.6 -817.5 8.6 -723.3 -824.8 10661.9 5592 5069.9 10054.9 5295.7 4759.2 
EU++ 9.7 -818.9 -1069.3 9.1 -859 -1078.9 17014.7 8475.2 8539.5 16078.4 8064.8 8013.6 
Africa 67.9 956.6 64.9 913.7 -3758.6   -3237.3   
South-East Asia 7.7 29.5 7.1 27.2 -129.1   -112.1   
Central America 16.4 25.8 15.1 23.8 -115.6   -100.3   
South America 12.4 175.4 22.9 325 -868.8   -1376.2   
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Table 13: Tighter carbon constraints: Compliance costs by scenario, region and sector (million €2005) 
Scenario 
Region 
CDM [EU] 
- Original carbon contraints - 
Deforestation_highTC [EU] 
- Tighter carbon constraints - 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 11171.8 6166.3 5005.5 7784.8 4314.7 3470.1 
EU+ 36639 10330.5 26308.5 47553.3 10874.2 36679.1 
EU++ 56633.4 13821.6 42811.8 80931.6 16588.1 64343.5 
Africa 0 0 0 -1363.4   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 -63.8   
Central America 0 0 0 -57   
South America 0 0 0 -463.1   
Scenario 
Region 
CDM [EU+] 
- Original carbon contraints - 
Deforestation_highTC [EU+] 
- Tighter carbon constraints - 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 12915.8 7079.5 5836.3 8752.4 4838.6 3913.8 
EU+ 14545.6 7407.1 7138.5 11412.9 6049 5363.9 
EU++ 34540 10898.2 23641.8 44791.2 11762.9 33028.3 
Africa 0 0 0 -2075.4   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 -82.7   
Central America 0 0 0 -73.9   
South America 0 0 0 -600.9   
Scenario 
Region 
CDM [EU++] 
- Original carbon contraints - 
Deforestation_highTC [EU++] 
- Tighter carbon constraints - 
 TOTAL EIS NEIS TOTAL EIS NEIS 
EU 15429.9 8365.7 7064.2 12489 6832.2 5656.8 
EU+ 16985.9 8458.5 8527.4 15965 8304 7661 
EU++ 26293.2 11889.1 14404.1 25932.9 12873.1 13059.8 
Africa 0 0 0 -5056.7   
South-East Asia 0 0 0 -182.5   
Central America 0 0 0 -163.5   
South America 0 0 0 -1329.3   
 
 
Table 14: Tighter carbon constraints: Carbon permit price by scenario and sector (€2005 per tCO2) 
Scenario 
Scenario 
CDM 
- Original carbon contraints - 
Deforestation_highTC 
- Tighter carbon constraints - 
 EIS NEIS EIS NEIS
[EU] 9.2 9.2 5.5 5.5 
[EU+] 10.8 10.8 6.2 6.2 
[EU++] 13.2 13.2 9 9 
 
 
 
